The Time is ow
On December 31, all commercial banks, savings-and-Ioan associations and mutual savings banks will be able to offer interestbearing checking accounts. These accounts, called N OW (Negotiable Order of Withd raw a I) accou nts, cou Id change the natu re of banking in this country and affectthe conduct of monetary policy. With the advent of nationwide N OW accounts, commercial banks and credit unions will no longer be the only depository institutions capable of offering interest -beari ng checki ng-type accou nts nationwide. Henceforth, S&L's and mutuals will take the opportunity to compete headto-head with banks as one-stop family financial centers.
Aggressive thrift-institution promotion campaigns will intensify the competition for household accounts. (Regulatory authorities have set the ceiling interest rate on N OW accou nts at 5 % percent, but competition for N OW funds will increasingly center around terms for services.) Many consumers, who until recently have been denied the opportunity to earn explicit interest on their checking accounts, will find N OW accounts very attractive. As a result, N OW balances are likely to grow rapidly.
Rapid growth in N OW balances will heighten the uncertainty affecting the conduct of monetary policy. In February 1981, the Federal Reserve will set the growth-rate ranges for several measures of the money supply for that calendar year. N OW-account growth will affect growth in each of these monetary aggregates differently. Thus, in order to choose appropriate target ranges, the Fed must predict how fast N OW balances will grow.and which financial assets will be converted to N OWs. N OW accounts thus wi II produce benefits for many households, but initially will create difficulties for the Fed in its task of selecting long-run target ranges for money-supply growth. After several efforts to legalize N OW ac-_ counts nationwide, Congress finally granted N OW authority (or similar authority) to all depository institutions with the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in March, 1980. The ceiling interest rate for N OWs, which will be available to individuals, households and nonprofit organizations, was set at 5% percent for all institutions. This is the same figure as the passbook-savings rate at commercial banks and 1/4 percent less than the passbook rate at thrift institutions.
Stiff competition
Although depository institutions cannot accept N OW deposits ur:til the end of the year, competition for N OW dollars is already beginning to heat up. A sizable number of banks and savings-and-Ioan associations, particularly in the West, have begun to promote N OWs aggressively. Some S&Ls are trying to build a N OW customer base by offering preauthorized-transfer and telephone bill-paying accounts that will automatically be converted to N O W accounts on January 1. But some banks, in their marketing efforts, are trying to get a headstart on the thrift competition by stressing the similarity of their currently-available ATS (Automatic Transfer from Savings) accounts to N O W accounts.
The growing intensity of the competition among depository institutions is most evident in the pricing field, with a wide range of minimum balances and service charges quoted. Minimum balances necessary to avoid service charges on N OW accounts range from zero in a few cases to $2,000 or more. Some institutions do not require minimum N O W balances, but require substantial balances in other accounts. For the N OW account balances orother qualifying account balances that fall below the requ ired minimum, monthly maintenance charges range from $2 to $7, while transactions fees range from zero to 15 cents per check.
Terms thus vary widely, but as a group, savings-and-Ioan associations are pricing their N OW accounts more liberally than commercial banks. Many of the major California banks, for example, have announced that the minimum N O W balance necessary to avoid service charges will be $1,500 to $2,000, while some of the larger California S&Ls will require only $500 to $1,000. The reason for this disparity in terms is a difference in the way the different institutions view N OW accounts. Many banks do not view N OWsas a means of expanding their deposit bases, but as a means of protecting their present deposits. After all, bankers are not eager to see all of their regular zero-interest demand-deposit.accounts switch to N OWs. By offering a wide variety of services in addition to N OW accounts (such as convenientlylocated branch offices, automated-teller machines, etc.), banks may be able to retain a high proportion of their deposits in spite of less liberal terms. Since banks will incur higher costs by offering these services with their N OWs, many are prepared to let their less profitable, lower-balance accounts switch to S&Ls.
2 Savings-and-Ioan associations, on the other hand, are generally eager to see their N O W balances grow, because they view N OW accounts as a means of increasing their market share relative to banks. Some S&L executives reason that N O W funds are more likel.y to come from bank demand-deposit accounts than from their own passbook-savings accounts. They are attracted to this new source of funds. in spite of processing costs and reserve requirements, because it is less expensive than borrowing from Federal Home Loan Banks or paying 12 to 14 percent for funds in the money and capital markets.
The most important reason for S&L pricing behavior, however, may be their recognition of the opportunities available from competing head-to-head with banks for household funds. The ability to offer checking accounts, S&Ls contend, is the key to their ability to retain their share of passbook savings, since the convenience of one-stop banking is a key factor in household decisions about where to put their funds. Despite their ability to offer Y4-percent more than banks on savings-deposit-interest, the thrifts' share of passbook savings has declined steadily from 65 percent in 1966 to 53 percent in September 1980, although their share of small time deposits has moved in the opposite direction. Thus, because of a desire to acquire new funds and regain their share of savings funds, savings-and-Ioan associations are pricing their N OW accounts lower than banks' N O W accounts. This pricing strategy means that S&Ls are likely to gain a large number of accounts, but that the average balance in those accounts may well be lower than in bank-held N OWs.
Pricing strategies
Bankers are concerned that S&Ls and mutuals are adopting an overly aggressive price strategy, either because the thrifts lack experience in pricing checking-type accounts, or because the thrifts are deliberately sacrificing short-run profits to gain market share. (Of course, underpricing makes sense from the thrifts' perspective only if the deposits they lure away from banks do not switch back 1973 1974 1975 1976 once prices are raised to cover costs.) If these institutions are underpricing their N OW accounts, banks may be forced to do the same, so that aggregate financial-institution profits will decline.
Growth of NOW s in
The evidence from the New England experience is somewhat mixed. By 1976, most savings banks in Massachusetts and New Hampshire offered free N OW accounts paying the maximum (5 percent) interest rate. Commercial banks, on the other hand, offered N OWs paying 5 percent but required a minimum balance to avoid service charges. Despite the desire to catch up with the savings banks, commercial banks generally did not succumb to the pressure to offer free N OWs. Somewhat surprisingly, then, commercial banks' share of N OW balances in Massachusetts and New Hampshire grew throughout this period, reaching 57 percent by December 1976.
Despite this more conservative pricing strategy, N OW accounts may have been more harmful to New England commercia! banks' profitability, both in the short run and over the longer run, than to mutual-savings banks' profitability. Commercial banks in Massachusetts and New Hampshire were generally much more profitable than their thrift competitors before the introduction of N OW accounts, and N OW accounts thus may have served to narrow the gap. This result is consistent with the thrifts' argument that the ability to offer checking accounts makes it possible for them to compete much more effectively with commercial banks.
Monitoring the M's
Aggressive promotion of N OW accounts will cause N OW balances to grow very rapidly in 1981, creating difficulties for the Federal Reserve in its task of setting growth-rate target ranges for the monetC!ry aggregates. The Fed must predict not only how fast N OWs will 3 grow, but whether N OW growth will come primarily at the expense of growth in checking accounts or growth in savings deposits. Shifts from traditional checking acounts to N OWs will cause M-1 A, which includes commercial-bank checking accounts, to grow more slowly than in the past. However, shifts from savings and other accounts to N OWs will cause the M-1 B aggregate, which includes M-OiA and other checkable deposits (pri mari Iy ATS and N OW), to grow faster than in the past without changingthe rate of. growth in M-1 A.
The New England experience suggests that roughly two-thirds of N OW balances come from checking accounts, and that the remainder come from other financial assets, primarily savings. N OW growth in 1981 may well repeatthis general pattern, since the minimum-balance pricing of N OWs encourages consumers to combine checking and savings funds. Therefore, growth in N OW balances is likely to depress M-1 A growth as funds are shifted out of traditional checking accounts, and to boost M-1 B growth as funds are shifted out of savings and other interest--earning assets.
In light of the potential for substantial shifts of funds following the introduction of nationwide N OW accounts, there will be less certainty than usual in the expectations of relative growth of the aggregates that the Federal Reserve builds into its money-growth targets. For this reason, the Fed has indicated that caution is necessary in interpreting the initial 1981 targets. As Chairman Volckersaid in his monetary-pol icy report to Congress last Ju Iy, the Fed wi II seek reduced rates of monetary growth over the long run, but the range for M-l B, in particular, may have to accommodate a period of abnormal growth as the public adjusts to N OW accounts.
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